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and to ensure that that trust is not misplaced. [Citations.] Sadly, this case transle with too others as an example of an attorney's preference of his personal interests in manifest (In the Matter of Kittrell (Review Dept. 2003) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct.

Respondent argues that he should not be responsible for a client's investment just because he "also happens to be a stockholder in that company." (Respondent's Closing Arguments, 17:21-24.) Such a cavalier attitude undermines the purpose of rule 3-300.

Respondent clearly failed to demonstrate that the dealings with the Randhawas were fair and reasonable. (Hunniecutt v. State Bar (1988) 44 Cal.3d 362, 372-373.)

Respondent clearly and convincingly violated rule 3-300 by failing to comply with its prophylactic requirements. Respondent knew that the terms of the business transaction were unfair and unreasonable to the Randhawas in that they did not receive any evidence of their investment, such as a stock certificate or promissory note. In fact, the Randhawas were never given any interest in AFL. Also, the Randhawas' investment was not secured. Further, the transaction and its terms were never fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the Randhawas in a manner that should reasonably have been understood by them. Moreover, the Randhawas were never advised in writing that they should seek the advice of an independent lawyer of their choice nor were they given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of an independent lawyer of their choice. Finally, Respondent did not obtain written consent from the Randhawas to the terms of the transaction. Thus, Respondent violated rule 3-300.

2. Count Two: Misappropriation (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6106)

Business and Professions Code section 6106²¹ provides that the member's commission of an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption constitutes grounds for suspension or disharment.

The State Bar charges that Respondent, after receiving the Randhawas' \$25,000 investment funds, misappropriated those funds, thus committing acts of moral turpitude and dishonesty.


21 References to sections are to sections of the Business and Professions Code Rules

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ANNEX 13 (12)



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All Respondent argues that he never asked the Randhawas to invest in AFL and that the any idea of how the Randhawas got access to his deposit slips. He also alleges that the deposit slips were stolen from his office while the Randhawas testified that he gave them specific depositing instructions. Once the Randhawas deposited the money into his personal account and the Khanna Foods account, Respondent then claims that the \$9,000 in his personal account was for legals fees that the Randhawas still owed him despite the fact that there were no outstanding fees. He asserts that the \$16,000 in the Khanna Foods account belonged to AFL and was nonrefundable to his clients. He further tells a convoluted story of how his mother gave another \$16,000 to AFL so that the \$16,000 remaining in the Khanna Foods account could be his personal money. As discussed earlier, the Court finds Respondent's story unbelievable and rejects each of his fabrications.

In fact, Respondent engaged in a scheme to defraud the Randhawas out of their money by luring them to invest in a nonexistent company and then spent their money on his personal expenses. The promised stock certificates never materialized. Therefore, by misappropriating \$31,000 advanced by the Randhawas, Respondent committed acts of moral turpitude and dishenesty in wilful violation of section 6106.

3. Count Three: Failure to Return Client Files (Rules Prof. Conduct, Rule 3-700(D)(1))

Respondent is charged with a violation of rule 3-700(D)(1), which provides that a member whose employment has terminated must promptly release all papers and property to the client at the request of the client.

Respondent contends that in January 2002 he had not sent the files to attorney Byrnes because he did not know who to send the files to and was not sure if attorney Byrnes still represented the Randhawas.²² In his April 2002 letter to the State Bar, Respondent indicated that he still did not know to whom to send the Randhawa files.²³ At trial he blamed attorney Byrnes for not calling him

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
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²²State Bar exhibit 11.

²³ State Bar exhibit 13, p. 2.



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minit whether attorney Byrnes wanted to view the files and for not sending him a letter of milionization from the Randhawas. In other word, Respondent argues that he was in a fog as to what to do with the files.

Contrary to Respondent's assertion, attorney Byrnes' repeated requests for the client files in July and September 2001 constitute a sufficiently specific request under rule 3-700(D)(1). Respondent clearly was aware of the obligation because he replied to those letters, albeit nonresponsive, and admitted that Jagjit "has an absolute right to those files." After October 2001, when Respondent failed to make the files available or send them to attorney Byrnes in a timely manner, attorney Byrnes assisted the Randhawas in filing a complaint with the State Bar.

Byrnes on April 25, 2002, that he was going to send the files to attorney Byrnes. In attorney Byrnes' May 9, 2002 letter to the State Bar, attorney Byrnes confirmed that he had received the Randhawa files from Respondent. Respondent's failure to comply with attorney Brynes' July 18, 2001 request for the Randhawas files until late April 2002 is clear and convincing evidence that Respondent is culpable of violating rule 3-700(D)(1). Respondent's defense of misunderstanding is not justified.

4. Count Four: Failure to Render Accounts (Rule 4-100(B)(3))

Respondent is charged with a violation of rule 4-100(B)(3), which provides that a member must maintain complete records of all funds, securities and properties of a client coming into the possession of the member or law firm and render appropriate accounts to the client regarding them.

The Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent is culpable of violating rule 4-100(B)(3). In response to attorney Brynes' request for an accounting of the investment funds and legal fees, Respondent's July 13, 2001 letter did not contain a breakdown of the legal fees that he had been paid. Instead, he simply listed the alleged total amount of legal fees received from his clients and the total amount of outstanding fees in each matter. Moreover, Respondent attempted

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





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²⁴ State Bar exhibits 14 and 15.

²⁵ State Bar exhibit 16.





anded that the Randhawas show him the receipts of money they had sent to India for investment

The Supreme Court noted the duty of an attorney to keep proper accounting books and client transactions records so that the attorney could produce them and show fair dealing if the attorney's actions were called into question. "The failure to keep proper books ... is in itself a suspicious circumstance." (Clark v. State Bar (1952) 39 Cal.2d 161, 174.)

To date, the Randhawas have not received an accounting of the \$31,000 they had invested in AFL or their legal fees. Respondent's failure to render an accounting of the monies received from the Randhawas constitutes a wilful failure to render an appropriate account of client funds within the meaning of rule 4-100(B)(3). (See In the Matter of Fonte (Review Dept. 1994) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 752, 758.)

5. Count Five: Misrepresentations to the State Bar Regarding Client Funds (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6106)

The State Bar charges that Respondent violated section 6106 by misrepresenting to and misleading the State Bar regarding the disposition of the funds the Randhawas had given him in his letters to the State Bar on January 30 and April 11, 2002

In the January letter, Respondent stated that he fonly had authority from AFL to use [the Khanna Foods] account for payment of AFL incurred usual incidental expenses in the United States." In the April letter, Respondent again claimed that the account "was strictly for expenses and other related expenses incurred by [Respondent] as [AFL's] legal representative in the United States." In fact, Respondent used the account to pay Respondent's personal bills and purchases, such as computers and a parking citation.

Respondent also denied that he was responsible for the Randhawas' investment in AFL. He wrote in the April letter to the State Bar, "Mr. Randhawas deposited the funds for investment purposes and on his own initiative and volition. I never told him to do so the Respondent further.

²⁶State Bar exhibit 13.

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ANNEXTURE No. 13 (15)



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
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hat the Randhawas had deposited the funds in Respondent's bank accounts without being

divestments." He claimed that he had no knowledge of how the Randhawas knew about his accounts when in fact, he gave them the deposit slips and instructed them to deposit installments of less than \$10,000 each time. He told the State Bar that he would advise AFL not to allow the Randhawas to invest and to return the money. But AFL supposedly acknowledged receipt of the funds, thanked the clients, and assured them the stock certificates were forthcoming.

Finally, he asserted that he had nothing to do with the investment funds and that the clients had to seek a refund from AFL directly. He feigned how upset he was upon finding out about the investment. Yet, he treated the \$16,000 as his own personal funds and the \$9,000 as payment for legal fees.

Therefore, Respondent clearly committed acts of moral turpitude by making these false, contradictory and misleading statements regarding the client funds to the State Bar in wilful violation of section 6106.

6. Count Six: Misrepresentations to the State Bur Regarding Client Files (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6106)

Respondent is charged with violating section 6106 by making numerous misrepresentations and misleading statements to the State Bar regarding the Randhawas' files. In his January 2002 letter to the State Bar, Respondent claimed that it was the "first time" he had heard the clients demanded their files. In fact, attorney Byrnes had been requesting them since July 2001. Respondent also asserted that he had offered attorney Byrnes "to see them at the time suitable to both of them." On the contrary, he told attorney Byrnes that he could send the copies of all the files and that he would charge him the going rate for copying and Respondent's time for copying. He also claimed that he told attorney Byrnes that he could see the files anytime after October 15, 2001 but that he had not heard from attorney Byrnes.

Arguably, because Respondent wrote "can certainly send" and not "will certainly send," it

27State Bar exhibit 11.

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
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Definite that Respondent was going to forward the files to attorney Byrnes.

Let never directly told attorney Byrnes that the files were available for his review after October 2001. After waiting five months without any success, attorney Byrnes reasonably decided that rainer than wasting time in a battle with Respondent to retrieve the files, he and his clients would seek the State Bar's assistance. Even that took an additional five months since Respondent continued to deny his unwillingness to release the files to his clients and blamed attorney Byrnes for the inexcusable miscommunication. In his April 25, 2002 letter to the State Bar, Respondent insisted that "[a]t no point in time anyone asked [him] to either forward or send the files to Mr. Byrnes."

The Court finds his contentions groundless. He had clearly and convincingly violated section 6106 by misrepresenting to and misleading the State Bar that he had offered attorney Byrnes an opportunity to review the client files but attorney Byrnes had chosen to ignore the opportunity. In fact, it was Respondent who did not promptly release the files as requested.

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7. Count 7: Failure to Cooperate With the State Bar (Section 6068(i))

Section 6068(i) provides that an attorney must cooperate and participate in any disciplinary investigation or proceeding pending against the attorney.

The State Bar alleges that Respondent failed to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation by making false and misleading statements to the State Bar.

Because Respondent responded to the State Bar's letters, albeit untruthful, he did not substantively violate the statute requiring him to cooperate with the State Bar's hivestigation of his misconduct. His misrepresentations to the State Bar have already been found in violation of section 6106. Therefore, Respondent did not violate section 6068(i).

IV. LEVEL OF DISCIPLINE

A. Factors in Mitigation

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Respondent bears the burden of proving mitigating circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std.

28 State Bar exhibit 14.

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
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
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Furthermore, Respondent failed to provide any fee agreement to the Randhawar of an thought the fees exceeded \$1,000. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6148.) This uncharged misconduct is considered as further aggravation. (Std. 1.2(b)(iii).)

Respondent's misappropriation of \$31,000 caused the Randhawas substantial harm. (Std. 1.2(b)(iv).) The clients hold working class jobs with limited financial means. Despite their many requests for a refund or an accounting of their investment, Respondent has not returned the money to the Randhawas.

Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his misconduct. (Std. 1.2(b)(v).) He refuses to admit to any wrongdoing, despite the clear and convincing evidence, and has never reimbursed any of the funds misappropriated from the clients. Instead, he insists that the Randhawas were to blame for their financial loss and that Respondent was the victim of the Randhawas' dishonesty.

Respondent displayed a lack of cooperation to the Randhawas. (Std. 1.2(b)(vi).) His lack of candor to the State Bar has already been found as a violation of section 6106. More significantly, Respondent's misrepresentations at trial and in his closing brief are further aggravating. "Under certain circumstances, false testimony before the State Bar may constitute an even greater offense than misappropriation of clients' funds." (Doyle v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal:3d 12, 23.) Here, Respondent's testimony regarding the existence of AFL, his inability to refund the investment funds, the incredible letters and documents from alleged officers of AFL, the theft of the deposit slips, and so on, was deliberately false. His lack of candor is a strong aggravating circumstance.

V. DISCUSSION

The purpose of State Bar disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the attorney, but to protect the public, to preserve public confidence in the profession and to maintain the highest possible professional standards for attorneys. (Chadwick v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 103, 111; Cooper v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1016, 1025; Std. 1.3.)

This case involves misappropriation of about \$31,000, fraud, failure to release client files, failure to render accounts, failure to avoid adverse interests, and repeated misrepresentations to the State Bar. The standards for Respondent's misconduct provide a broad range of sanctions ranging


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
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Aventage of immigrants clients who had extremely limited financial means, a significant diguage barrier, and virtually no business and investment experience. The State Bar has cited several cases in support of its disciplinary recommendation, including In the Matter of Kittrell (Review Dept. 2003) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 615, Rose v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal. 3d 646, Beery v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal. 3d 802, and In the Matter of Peavey (Review Dept. 2002) 4 Cal. State Bar

Ct. Rptr. 483, and In the Matter of Johnson (Review Dept. 1995) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 233.

The Court finds Respondent's arguments without merit and his misconduct significantly more outrageous than that of the attorneys in Kittrell, Rose, Beery, Reave) or Johnson. Moreover, Respondent presented no mitigating evidence even though he had been in practice for 25 years.

In Kittrell, the attorney, who had been in practice for 24 years, was actually suspended for three years for entering into a real estate transaction with an unsophisticated client who lost her life savings of \$61,000 in the transaction. The attorney concealed material facts and known risks from his client about the investment. Instead, he told the client that it was a "can't lose" investment.

In the other cases cited by the State Bar, those attorneys were actually suspended for two years for persuading vulnerable clients to invest in failed businesses without disclosing significant risks and abused the trust placed in them by their clients.

Here, at the time Respondent seduced his clients to invest in a high risk business, Respondent knew or should have known that the business was a sham. The company was talleged to be incorporated in 1992; the Khanna Foods account was never adequately funded, other than with the Randhawas' money; the company was supposed to be liquidated in 2003, some Hayears later without ever having done any business; and at trial, Respondent testified that the current status of AFL was good and that "in a year or two might be very good." Respondent's misrepresentations continue.

To further aggravate his misconduct, he advances his fraudulent and contrived misrepresentations before this Court by maligning the character and integrity of his clients, attorney Brynes and Deputy Trial Counsel Albertsen-Murray, by producing uncertified documents and alleged letters from AFL's officers, by asserting that the \$25,000 is now his and by denying ever having received the additional \$6,000 from the Randhawas.

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
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 Respondent's misconduct reflects a blatant disregard of professional respectabilities. He clearly has shown no insight into his wrongdoing. He had flagrantly breached his fiduciary duties to the Randhawas and abused their trust as their attorney. When he told them that AFL was a lucrative business venture and that he needed the funds before his trip to India, the Randhawas believed him. Respondent exploited the Randhawas trust, lack of business experience and high hope for a profitable return of their investment. He has refused to accept responsibility for his misconduct and has done nothing to rectify the harm he has caused.

It is settled that an attorney-client relationship is of the highest fiduciary character and always requires utmost fidelity and fair dealing on the part of the attorney. (Beers v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 802, 813.) The Supreme Court noted that "[t]he essence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship is that the parties do not deal on equal terms, because the person in whom trust and confidence is reposed and who accepts that trust and confidence is in a superior position to exert unique influence over the dependent party." (Id.)

The misappropriation of client funds is a grievous breach of an attorney's ethical responsibilities, violates basic notions of honesty and endangers public confidence in the legal profession. In all but the most exceptional cases, it requires the imposition of the harshest discipline – disbarment. (Grim v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 21.) In Kaplan v. State Bar (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1067, the Supreme Court disbarred an attorney who intentionally misappropriated \$29,000 from his law firm. In In the Matter of Spaith, supra, 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 511, the attorney was disbarred for misappropriating \$40,000 from a client's personal injury settlement funds and misled the client over a year as to the status of the money.

In a similar case, In the Matter of Priamos (Review Dept. 1998).3 Gal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 824, the attorney engaged in business transactions with a client and committed acts of moral turpitude by his seven year self-dealing with over \$500,000 of investment funds he was asked by his client to handle, which included the attorney unilaterally paying himself nearly \$450,000 in management and legal fees. The attorney's failure to demonstrate an appreciation of misconduct or learn from his extended period of overreaching of his vulnerable client was a significant aggravating factor to disbar him.

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
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
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


Filed 10/05/2007 Page 23 of 34 Case 4:07-cv-05136-CW In this case, it has been almost eight years since the Randhawas gave Response for investment. Respondent unilaterally declares \$9,000 as payment for outstanding legs 2 3 \$16,000 as his own funds and denies receipt of the remaining \$6,000. He has no accounting to evidence any outstanding legal fees owed by the Randhawas; no banking statements to support the 4. banking transactions among AFL, his mother and the Khanna Foods account; and no certified 5 documents of AFL as a legitimate corporation or a viable business entity. Like the attorney in 6 Priamos, Respondent has no insight into his misconducte 7 Moral turpitude is defined as "an act of baseness, vileness of depravity in the private and 8 social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted 9 and customary rule of right and duty between man and man." (In re Higbie (1972) 6 Cal.3d 562, 10 569.) Respondent has clearly and wilfully committed multiple acts of moral turpitude. 11 12 In recommending discipline, the "paramount concern is protection of the public, the courts and the integrity of the legal profession." (Snyder v. State Bar (1990) 49 Cal.3d 1302.) "It is clear 13 that disbarment is not reserved just for attorneys with prior disciplinary records. [Citations.] A most 14 significant factor . . . is respondent's complete lack of insight, recognition, or remorse for any of 15 his wrongdoing. To the present time, he accepts no responsibility for what happened and only seeks 16 to blame others." (In the Matter of Wyshak (Review Dept. 1999) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 70, 83) 17 An attorney's failure to accept responsibility for actions which are wrong or to understand that 18 wrongfulness is considered an aggravating factor. (Carrelan State Bas (1988) 44 Cal. 341091, 1100s 19 20 1101.) In this matter, the aggravating circumstances are significant (Although the Court had 21 encouraged Respondent to provide mitigating evidence, he produced none. Respondent's refusal 22 to return funds to the Randhawas, significant client harm and continuous failure to comprehend basic 23 adherence to fiduciary duties owed to clients warrant the highest level of public protection. Instead 24 of recognizing his wrongdoing, Respondent went to great length during his testimony to deny his 25 misconduct and blamed his clients for giving him the money. He insists that he was the victim, not 26 27 his clients. 28 While the Randhawas may have had personal problems in the past, those issues are irrelevant Rramine: HIER KERLEY LA Sub Divini

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Respondent "is not entitled to be recommended to the public as a person worth of the use accordingly not entitled to continue to practice law." (Resner v. State Bar (1960) 53 Cal 20 603 615.) Therefore, based on the severity of the offenses, the serious aggravating circumstances and the lack of mitigating factors, the Court recommends disbarment.

VI. RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINE

This Court recommends that Respondent PADAM KUMAR KHANNA be disbarred from the practice of law in the State of California and that his name be stricken from the rolls of attorneys in this State.

It is also recommended that the Supreme Court order Respondent to comply with rule 955, paragraphs (a) and (c), of the California Rules of Court, within 30 and 40 days, respectively, of the effective date of its order imposing discipline in this matter. Company Company

VII. COSTS

The Court recommends that costs be awarded to the State Bar pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6086.10 and payable in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.7.

VIII. ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT

It is ordered that Respondent be transferred to involuntary inactive enrollment status pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6007(c)(4) and rule 220(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar. The inactive enrollment shall become effective three-calcular days after service of this order.

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Dated: October 20, 2004


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
Judge of the State Bar Court


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ANNEXTURE NO.

Sub Divisional Magistrate Rajouri Garden, Old Middle School Complex. Ram Pura, Delhi-110035.







ATTACHMENT THREE

Sase 4:07-cv-

(Retired Judge / Metropolitan Magistrate) Distt. & Session's Court Delhi **ADVOCATE** DELHI HIGH COURT & SUPREME

Speed Post/A.D./UP.C

Page 32 of 34 Chamber No. K-75, Near Gate No. 2, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi-54 Mobile: 9891052211

Office-Cum-Resi.: 128, Rajdhani Enclave. Pitam Pura, Delhi-110034 Phone: 55398813 Mob.: 9811329291

Dated 15. 2, 2007

Ref. No.

To

- Sh. Jagjit Singh Randhawa 395. Sparrow Drive. Heroules, California, United States of America
- 2. Mrs.Baljit Singh Randhawa wife of Mr. Jegjit Singh Rendhava, 395. Sparmy Drive Hercules, California, United States of America.

Dear Sir/Medem.

Under instructions from and on behalf of my clients M/s. Agerindia Poods Limited, 14-H/CC, Hari Negar, New Delhi-110064, through its Mirector Sh.K.S.Khanna, I hereby serve you with the following legal notices-

- to That my aforesaid client is a Registered Company, registered with Registrar of Companies, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderbad, India, vide Registeration Certificate dt. 30th October, 1992, under Indian Companies Act, 1956,
- 2. That you both had purchased shares of my aforesaid client and my aforesaid client had issued you, addressee No. 1, Share Certificate No.8, No. of shares 50000, vide Share Ledger Folio No.37 dated 13.11.2003, of face value of h. 10/ each, distinctive No.71 to 50076, against payment of h.5.00.000/*(Rupees five lace) paid by you addressee Ho.1, wide Pay Order No.001108 dt.30.12.1996, issued by Union Bank of India, Masik City, Maharashtra, India, My aforesaid clients had accordingly acknowledged the receipt of said sum of a.5.00.000/-(Rupees five lace)only, wide letter dt. 21, 12, 1996 addressed to you addressee No. 1.
- That my aforesaid clients had also sent letter dt.7.7.1997 and 19.9.1997 to you addressee No.1. regarding affairs of my olients company Sh. Pedem Kumar Khanna,
- That/authorised representative of my aforesaid clients used to deal with you regarding your investment in the company of aforesaid olients. However, you have filed a false complaint against set & Mr. Paden Labor Khanns, with false allegations that he was not authorized representative of my clients, and/or my clients. are not in existence, and r. Padam Kumar Khanna has mis-appropriated said sum of h.5.00.000/-(25.000 JS \$)instead of investing said sum in purchasing shares of my clients' company, with State Bar of California, investigated by Alice Verstegen, Attorney, Special Investigator, Office of The Chief Trial Counsel, Enforcement, 1149, South Hill Street, Los Angeles, California, USA. In response to queries put by Special Investigator, my client vide reply dt. 12.9. 200]

R. SCasy 127+1105136-CW

(Retired Judge / Metropolitan Magistrate)

Distt. & Session's Court Delhi

ADVOCATE

DELHI HIGH COURT & SUPREME

Document 1-4 Filed 10/05/2007

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Near Gate No. 2, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi-54

Mobile: 9891052211.

Office-Cum-Resi. : 128, Rajdhani Enclave, Pitam Pura, Delhi-110034

Phone: 55398813 Mob.: 9811329291

Ref. No.

Dated

to letter dt. 19. 2. 2003 sent to Special Investigator, submitted detailed particulars support with documents, regarding existance of my clients as Registered Limited Company in India. Sh.Padan Kumar Khanna as its Authorised Representative, and your investment of 5,00,000/-(25,000 US \$) for purchase of 50.000/ shares each having face value of b. 10/-. However, The State Bar of California, was pleased to impose a penalty of US \$ 31000 against Mr.Padem Kumar Khanna, and his licence has also been cancelled.

- 5. You, knowing fully well that your said money was invested in purchase of 50000 shares in the company of my aforesaid client, you said money was duly acknowledged by my aforesaid client, and progress of my aforesaid clients was also communicated to you by my aforesaid clients from time to time, had initiated malicious prosecution against Mr. Padan Kumer Khanna, authorised representative of my aforesaid clients and due to which Mr.Padem Kumar Khanna has lost his licence, and also suffered penalty of US \$ 51000 without any cause or reason on his part, but due to malicious prosecution launched by you against him, with false allegations, insunations, accusation, imputations,
- 6. Mr.Khanna has also claimed damages/compensation for suffering said malicious prosecution launched by you, loss of his licence/ livelihood, loss of reputation, status, dignity, creditbility, business circle, clients etc.etc.
- 7. Due to your said malicious prosecution egainst Mr.Padan Kimer Khanna, with allegations that my clients/company is not in edistance and/or is a fake/sham company, my client has also suffered a lot, on account of its reputation, dignity, oreditability -business, clients etc. etc.
- 8. You are responsible and liable for lowering down the reputation, dignity, creditbility, status, business dealings, loss of clients, business-future prospects, perspective and prespective income, for your doing so, my client has suffered a lose of at least b. 25.00.000/~(Rupees twenty five lacs).
- You are, therefore, legally liable to pay and my clients are legally entitled to recover said sum of & 25,00,000/-(Rupeestwenty five lace) for causing disrepute, lowering down its reputation, status, dignity, creditbility, loss of business, clients, future business prespects, perspective and prespective income.

You are, therefore, called upon to pay to my aforesaid clients a sum of &. 25,00,000/-(Rupees twenty five lacs)only, as damages, for causing disrepute, lowering down its reputation, dignity, creditality, loss of clientage, business prospects, R. SaseMA-M-05/36-CW Document 1-4

Filed 10/05/2007

(Retired Judge / Metropolitan Magistrate)
Distt. & Session's Court Delhi
ADVOCATE
DELHI HIGH COURT & SUPREME

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Mob. : 9811329291

Ref. No.

-3-

perspective, prospective income, by making false allegations, accusation, insunation, imputations, allegations that my clients are not in existance, and/or are fake/sham company, etc, within 15 days of receipt of this notice positively, in default on your part in this regard, my clients shall be constrained to proceed against you for receivery of said sum, withis interest 0 %, 18% per annum, from date of receipt of this notice, till actually date of payment of said sum to my aforesaid client, in appropriate court of competent jurisdiction, at your risk, as to costs and consequences you shall be exclusively liable, besides your prosecution for committing offences punishable under Indian Penal Code,

Please take and comply with this no tice positively.

Copy kept.

THES. MARIA)